Mechanism design

Results: 750



#Item
111Auctions / Game theory / Auction theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Internet search / Sponsored search auction / Mechanism design / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Auction / Nash equilibrium / Vickrey auction

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanisms

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-30 16:18:44
112Economics / Mathematics / Social choice theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Valuation / Paul Milgrom / Single crossing condition / Preference / Information

The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu and William R. Zame1 This version: Abstract: The sensitivity of Bayesian implementation to agents’ beliefs about o

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
113Game theory / Decision theory / Mathematics / Bayesian game / Revelation principle / Correlated equilibrium / Strategy / Solution concept / Mechanism design / Outcome / Incentive compatibility / Intuitive criterion

Implementability of Correlated and Communication Equilibrium Outcomes in Incomplete Information Games

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-04-27 14:49:21
114Mechanism design / Game theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Mathematics / Revenue equivalence / Revelation principle / Paul Milgrom / Monotonicity / Valuation / Principalagent problem / Incentive compatibility

E¢cient Design with Interdependent Valuations Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu¤ First version: January 1998, This version: February 20, 2000 Abstract

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
115Game theory / Auction theory / Auctions / Decision theory / Gaming / Mechanism design / Vickrey auction / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Submodular set function / Price of anarchy

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #14: The Price of Anarchy in Simple Auctions ∗ Tim Roughgarden†

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-10 16:20:06
116Mechanism design / Game theory / Auctions / Auction theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Prior-independent mechanism / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Auction / Multiunit auction / Normal distribution

Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-11-02 19:36:35
117Mathematical analysis / Mathematics / Geometry / Calculus of variations / Envelope theorem / Inverse trigonometric functions / Envelope / Mechanism design

Discussion Paper NoLicensing Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder Cuihong Fan* Byoung Heon Jun**

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Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-06-22 05:02:51
118Game theory / Contract law / Asymmetric information / Screening / Option / Mechanism design / Economy / Business / Economics

WithdRights-Revision-Restud.dvi

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Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-05 07:40:45
119Auction theory / Auctions / Game theory / Marketing / Auction / Economy / Mechanism design / First-price sealed-bid auction

RESEARCH ARTICLE THE MAKING OF A GOOD IMPRESSION: INFORMATION HIDING IN AD EXCHANGES Zhen Sun, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, and Vijay Mookerjee Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dalla

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Source URL: www.misq.org

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-05 15:06:06
120Graph theory / Mathematics / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auctions / Hypergraph / Valuation / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Approximation algorithm / Treewidth / Optimization problem

Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements Ittai Abraham Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:21:18
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